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CORPORATE TAX AVOIDANCE 
PRACTICES OF MULTINATIONALS AND 
COUNTRY RESPONSES TO IMPROVE 
QUALITY OF COMPLIANCE 
 
Abstract: The aim of this systematic review was to review the 
methods adopted by corporates to avoid corporate tax, 
factors related to it and responses of countries to improve 
their compliance. Using Google Scholar with the topic as the 
search terms and different overlapping timeframes, the 
search yielded 68 papers. These were listed and briefly 
described. The common factors in these studies were 
tabulated for easy reference. It was a revelation in the way 
the corporates adopted methods to avoid sales tax. Papers 
dealing with policies, strategies and impact of sales tax on 
these corporates were in majority.  Economic growth 
variables and their linkage to sales tax were the basis of study 
of some papers. Corporate social responsibility is an 
essential part of corporate finance and an attempt to link it 
with their tax compliance practice was the subject in some. 
Studies also covered the role of civic and interest groups in 
preventing evasion of tax as detrimental to society at large. 
An important aspect which came to light was that as long as 
there is competition among countries on tax matters and the 
existence of tax havens, a defiance of the tax laws and the 
tendency to avoid tax was noticed.  Only a thorough reform of 
the tax laws in the countries will check these large scale 
evasions and bring more revenue where it is required. The 
need of the hour is a vigilant civil rights and interest group 
which can add pressure on the corporates to behave 
responsibly and ethically towards tax compliance.  The 
implications that these changes will bring is huge as it 
prevents leakage of income which is rightly due to the 
governments. This study will help in plugging the loop holes 
and ensuring stricter compliance with the laws of the land. 
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Many countries charge corporate taxes on 
business organisation in different manner 
and rates. Obviously, businesses would not 
like to be taxed at all. However, they are 
willing to tolerate a minimum tax. But they 
react when they are charged at higher than 
what they perceive as reasonable. Whatever 
is the rate, they have clever ways of 
accounting (accounting engineering) to 
minimise taxes paid to the country. The 
slogan “You cannot evade tax, but you can 
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avoid it”, is cleverly used by them. On the 
other hand, they express their eagerness to 
project as an organisation compliant with the 
laws of the country they operate in many 
ways.  
All the above statements are generally about 
any type of taxes. But corporate tax has its 
own characteristics. The definition for 
Corporate Tax given in the Economic Times 
(The Economic Times, 2020) is, 
“Corporation tax is a tax imposed on the net 
income of the company.” Sometimes a 
surcharge is levied based on net income 
slabs as in the case of India.  
The definition and a brief description of 
corporate tax in Investopedia is, “A 
corporate tax is a levy placed on a firm's 
profit by the government. The money 
collected from corporate taxes is used for a 
nation's source of income. A firm's operating 
earnings are calculated by deducting 
expenses including the cost of goods sold 
(COGS) and depreciation from revenues. 
Then, tax rates are applied to generate a legal 
obligation the business owes the 
government. Rules surrounding corporate 
taxation vary greatly worldwide, but they 
must be voted upon and approved by a 
country's government to be enacted.” 
The global trend of corporate tax (CT) rates 
(CTR) collected from 176 countries was 
evaluated by Elke (2019). The author 
observed that in 1980, the global average 
CTR was 40.38 and was 46.67 when 
weighted for GDP. As countries realised the 
negative impact of high CTR on business 
and thus on national economic growth, these 
taxes have been brought down gradually in 
many countries. Now, most countries have 
their CTR below 30%.  Highest CPR ranged 
33 to 55% in 21 states. The lowest CPR 
ranged 5.5% TO 12.5% in 21 countries. 
There were no CTR in 13 countries. The 
wide range of variations among countries 
may prompt businesses to locate their tax-
positive operations in least CTR countries.  
The aim of this systematic review is to 
examine how these differences in CTR 
impacts corporates operating in different 
countries. Stress is on the same corporates 
operating in different countries. 
 
2. Methodology  
 
Five pages each of Google Scholar was 
searched for different overlapping 
timeframes up to 2019 using the topic of this 
review as the search term. The search 
yielded 68 usable papers. These are listed, 
briefly described, extracted trends and 
discussed them to reach the final conclusions 




3.1 List of papers with brief descriptions 
 
1. Desai M. (2012) noted that high CTR 
leads to flight of capital from the country, 
reduce investments which would have 
enhanced the productivity of the workers, 
increasing real wages. Thus, the ultimate 
impact of high CTR is on workers. 
Characteristics like high CTR with narrow 
base, rapid increase of non-corporate 
income, which means high CTR has shifted 
even internal investments from corporate to 
non-corporate sectors within the country and 
globalisation of business enabling corporates 
to shift crucial operations from high CTR to 
low CTR countries and thus change their 
national identity. For US based corporates, 
foreign income is taxed both in its host 
country and in USA when repatriated after 
deducting the tax already paid in the host 
country. Such taxing systems prompt the 
companies to retain their income in the home 
country. Contrary to the belief that 
investments abroad are losses of the same 
investment in the home country, the firms 
expanding markets outside to become more 
efficient leading to more investment at 
home. The current trend is that corporates 
announce big profits in the media, but their 
books no taxable income. This doublespeak 
confuses shareholders, potential investors 
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and customers. The trust of the public on the 
company is eroded when high profits are 
reported, but no tax is paid. The complexity 
of the CT system and the variety of methods 
available to corporates makes them easy to 
avoid taxes and still remain within the laws. 
They cover up these tactics by projecting 
their Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
programmes. The author makes these 
observations and suggests solutions of tax 
reforms to address these undesirable trends 
for US context, but may be applicable to 
other countries in a similar situation.  
2. The host country CTR structure has 
significant influence on size of FDI inflows 
into it, according to the results of a study by 
Simmons (2003). The author used a tax 
attractiveness index prepared on the basis of 
discussions with investors and taxation 
experts for this work.  
3. Slemrod (2004) saw clear evidence for the 
independence of CTR from the revenue 
needs of any country. Also, no relationship 
of expenditure–GDP ratio with the statutory 
CTR was found. The evidence for a positive 
association with the average rate was weak. 
Distinctive influence of international 
competitive pressures was visible on CTR. 
Measures of openness were negatively 
associated with CTR, but not with revenues 
collected as a fraction of GDP. Larger, more 
trade-intensive countries collected more 
CTR, probably due to these countries being 
more attractive to investments. These 
findings are in apparent contradiction with 
many of the strongly held concepts.  
4. In the US context, many corporate 
inversions have taken place recently. The US 
multinational corporations joined with 
foreign companies to locate their joint 
corporate structure in a foreign country with 
an attractive CTR rate and policies. A high 
statutory tax rate, a global system of taxation 
and limits on income shifting in the US 
system are acting as incentives for such 
inversions. Corporate inversions permits 
more flexible access to foreign funds and 
makes it easier to shift income out of the US 
tax base. The recent large scale inversions 
might have happened due to the large 
accumulation of unrepatriated foreign cash. 
Pessimism about the prospect of policy 
changes for reduction in the US tax rates on 
repatriated incomes also has contributed to 
these inversions.  If left uncontrolled, 
corporate inversions are may shrink the US 
tax base. This justifies quick policy 
interventions in a targeted manner (Clausing 
& UBTP, 2014). 
5. Hines Jr (2005) observed that tax havens 
offer low CTR to foreign investors with 
other tax features, specifically aimed at 
designed to attract investment and thus 
enhance economic activity in the country. 
However, the global impact of these tax 
havens is significant in many ways. With 
less than 1 percent of the world's population 
(outside the United States) and only 2.3 
percent share of world GDP, they are able to 
attract 5.7 percent of the foreign employment 
and 8.4 percent of foreign property, plant, 
and equipment of the US business. Per capita 
real GDP of tax havens grew at an average 
annual rate of 3.3 percent during 1982-1999, 
compared to only 1.4% as the global 
average. The governments in tax havens 
procure adequate funds. The average 25% 
ratio of government to GDP is higher than 
20% ratio reported for the whole world, 
although the small populations and relative 
affluence of these countries are frequently 
associated with even larger governments. It 
is not clear whether the economic prosperity 
of tax havens comes at the expense of higher 
tax countries. But there is recent evidence 
that tax haven activity stimulates investment 
in nearby high-tax countries. 
6. According to the analysis of data on 
corporate tax rates and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in 19 OECD countries for 
the period of 1980-2000 by Jensen (2012) 
corporate tax rates were not associated with 
FDI. This means, multinationals may not 
always opt to invest in countries with low 
corporate tax rates.  
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7. Based on the analysis of the survey data of 
Bureau of Economic Analysis on U.S. 
multinational corporations for the period 
1983 to 2012, Clausing K. A. (2016) noted 
that there is substantial loss to US tax base 
due to profit shifting by US multinationals 
and the loss is increasing. The finding 
indicate booking of large amount of profits 
in tax havens. Erosion of corporate tax base 
erosion is more likely in the case of 
countries where the rates are higher.  
8. In a report, Cobham and Loretz (2014) 
reiterated that misalignment of profits and 
real economic activity occur under the 
current system of separate accounting due to 
tax-motivated international profit shifting. 
The current system of separate accounting 
facilitates taxation of profits of multinational 
companies in the respective countries in 
which they are earned. Corporate taxation is 
done by treating the subsidiaries of these 
companies as individual firms for calculation 
of taxable profits. With the wide disparities 
in corporate tax rates, multinational 
companies earn incentives by misallocating 
their taxable income to reduce their overall 
tax burden. Thus, international profit shifting 
by multinationals occur in response to tax 
differentials in an economically significant 
manner affecting the corporate tax bases of 
many EU and OECD countries. In the case 
of developing countries, due to absence of 
balance sheet data, trade data are used by 
researchers. Abnormal pricing may reflect 
tax outflows in this case. However, 
attributing multinational tax practices poses 
problems here. To restrict tax-reducing 
relocation of corporate profits, complex 
procedures are adopted in various countries 
like transfer pricing, thin capitalisation, 
permanent residence and related issues. EU 
and OECD, instead of examining the system 
itself, are examining only the system of 
separate accounting. However, such actions 
limited to the current international tax 
structure may not be effective in addressing 
the problem. Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) initiative 
wanted to measure and reduce this. But any 
significant progress is possible only if 
formulary apportionment methods or any 
other method outside the current 
international tax structures are implemented. 
The authors used the database of balance 
sheets of leading global companies for 
analysis. It was observed that if actual 
economic activity is used for apportioning 
profit, it would result in a major 
redistribution of the tax base at the expense 
of some specific jurisdictions. In most cases, 
this shift is towards the lower-income 
countries. If a global switch to unitary 
international taxation through loss 
consolidation is done, it would reduce the 
overall tax base by around 12 per cent.   
9. Cobham and Janský (2018) compared 
IMF estimates with Global Revenue Data 
(GRD) estimates and reported lower annual 
global revenue losses of around US $500 
billion, with the greatest intensity in low 
income and lower middle income countries, 
especially from sub-Saharan African, Latin 
American, the Caribbean and South Asian 
regions.  
10. According to an assessment of current 
US foreign income taxation rules using a 
simple framework done by Desai and Hines 
Jr (2004) the US tax burden on foreign 
income was about $50 billion a year. Such a 
heavy tax burden on foreign investment 
incomes is not favourable for promoting 
efficient ownership of capital assets from a 
national or global perspective.  Therefore, 
high potential exists for welfare gains by 
reducing the US foreign income taxation 
through positive tax reforms. This means 
ending the comfortable but misplaced 
arguments for using similar systems of 
taxation of both foreign and domestic 
incomes.  
11. Christensen and Murphy (2004) showed 
that majority of multinational businesses are 
being purposefully structured to facilitate tax 
avoidance in every country they operate. 
Some social activists strongly advocate for 
policy measures to remove the distortions 
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due to nationally based tax regimes made to 
struggle by globalised firms. There is urgent 
need for including full compliance with tax 
laws without tax avoidance measures in the 
Corporate Social Responsibility statements. 
They should also publish all necessary 
accounting information to prove that they 
have bot resorted to unfair tax avoidance 
practices.  
12. While switching operations and incomes 
across nations bestow tax avoidance 
advantage to multinational corporations, 
coordination costs can override this benefit 
fully or partially. With increasing expansion 
of international operations, risks first 
increase and then decrease. The risk is 
influenced by the cultural distance of the 
firm’s home country and host country. These 
conclusions were reported by Tong and 
Reuer (2007). 
13. Various types of domestic and 
international distortions and their estimates 
have been reported by many researchers. 
Nicodème (2008) found that the most 
significant or common types of them are 
distortions due to income shifting between 
capital and labour sources, profit shifting 
across countries, the effects of taxation on 
business location and foreign direct 
investment.   
14. Desai M. A. (2009) provided many 
examples of corporate manipulations of 
internationalising locations and operations. 
Earlier, corporates retained their home 
nation identity even if they operated in 
different countries. Globalisation 
universalised them beyond national 
boundaries.  Such location manipulations 
served the purposes of market access, 
valuation enhancement, avail multiple 
investment opportunities and not affecting 
simultaneous tax benefits from home 
countries. During the 1950’s to 1960’s, firms 
self-replicated in different locations in the 
form of horizontal FDI to surmount high 
tariffs and transportation costs by nearer to 
their customers. But unless capital 
investment can overcome the transportation 
costs and tariffs, such self-replication was 
not worthwhile, Decreasing costs made these 
practices obsolete. By 1990’s, off-shoring 
certain activities to cheaper locations became 
the practice leading to production chains 
being fragmented across the world. 
Headquarters retained the core activities and 
controls. Now unbundling of even 
headquarters functions started which blurred 
their national identities. Firms also relocate 
their financial home to places where they can 
save financial costs and investor protection 
rules are strong. Taxation regulations on 
home income and away income may also 
determine how the company divides its 
operations across the world.  
15. Desai and Dharmapala (2009) pointed 
out that increasing incidents of corporate tax 
avoidance shows the non-existence of a pure 
compliance function from corporations and 
their managers. Tax avoidance may be the 
most serious compliance issue for the 
American tax system. It is not a simple 
transfer of value from the state to 
shareholders. Tax avoidance reflects in 
difference between income reported to tax 
authorities and capital markets, decreasing 
effective tax rates in public financial 
statements and the increasing number of 
firms with no tax liability. The authors 
analysed the situation utilising the agency 
framework stressing on the role of managers 
in tax avoidance. Tax shelters substitute debt 
for financing the business through saving on 
tax. However, tax shelters only serve the 
purpose of tax avoidance and nothing else. 
Managers whose interests are akin to those 
of shareholders are more likely to practise 
tax avoidance in the interest of shareholders. 
Possibly, incentive compensation for 
managers may be related to the extent of tax 
saving gained by earnings management by 
managers. On the other hand, in the case of 
managers unwilling to practise tax 
avoidance, principal-agent problem may 
operate. Obscuring the intent of a financial 
transaction, often using tax shelters, may be 
an efficient way of tax avoidance by 
managers, sometimes independent of the 
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interests of shareholders. However, many 
factors complicate the sheltering and 
diversion options. Technology of either is 
one factor. Enron’s extensive use of tax 
shelters to achieve set goals of tax savings of 
its tax department is an example. Agency 
view of corporate tax avoidance seems to 
have merit. Thus, objectives of financial 
reporting becomes important in this respect. 
Legitimate tax avoidance for some non-tax 
purpose or not in conflict with shareholder 
value may be valid.  
16. According to Wilson (2009) firms, which 
actively engaged in tax sheltering, show 
higher ex post book‐tax differences and 
resort to more aggressive financial reporting 
practices. Positive abnormal returns are 
reported by active tax shelter firms with 
strong corporate governance. Thus, tax 
sheltering is used to create wealth in 
well‐governed firms.  
17. The same conclusion as that of Wilson 
(2009) was reached by Desai and 
Dharmapala (2009) using OLS estimates of 
unexplained differences between income 
reported to capital markets and to tax 
authorities.  
18. In a review study of effect of tax policies 
on the financial and non-financial behaviour 
of corporates, Hines Jr (1996) observed that 
taxation significantly influenced FDI, 
corporate borrowing, transfer pricing, 
dividend, royalty payments, R&D activity, 
exports, bribe payments, and location 
choices.  
19. US firms need to pay taxes on income 
earned both inside and outside the country. 
However, there are incentives created by the 
US tax system to avoid double tax payments 
for the incomes earned outside. Using data 
on 1986 corporate tax returns, Altshuler and 
Newlon (1991) studied on the extent of 
structuring and coordinating remittances of 
income by US firms from their foreign 
subsidiaries to reduce their US and foreign 
tax liabilities. The ability to use foreign tax 
credits generated from one source of foreign 
income to offset the US tax liability 
generated by other sources of foreign 
income, withholding tax rates on income 
remittances, variations in source country 
corporate income tax systems and dynamic 
aspects of the US tax system were 
considered. American multinationals were 
able to take advantage of the US tax system 
to avoid paying high amounts of tax on their 
foreign source income.  
20. Apart from the usual reasons for 
taxation, corporate tax has the additional 
rationale of regulating managerial and 
corporate power. This rationale justifies the 
need to fight the threats of tax shelters and 
tax competition. On the other hand, although 
the state wields enormous power through 
taxation, its ability to use this power is 
limited by the possibility of destroying or 
unduly damaging institutions which are 
required for the welfare of the citizens. 
Corporate taxation is an important regulatory 
method to manage the delicate balance 
between corporations, society and the state.  
To some extent any taxation is harmful to 
some or other components of the three 
partners of the system (Avi-Yonah, 2004).  
21. Tax competition in EU has resulted in 
high levels of reduction in tax rates, policies 
of broadening tax bases and possibility of 
distortions in firm decisions. Although more 
research has been done on tax on profits, 
non-profit taxes have become important in 
the context of recent global economic crisis 
burdening firms on overall tax payable. 
Consequently, tax regimes are characterised 
by rules restricting capitalization to thin 
levels, tightening of loss offset rules or a 
high proportion of non-profit taxes in the 
overall tax mix. These, in turn, contributed 
further to economic downturn. These 
conclusions were reported by Spengel and 
Zinn (2011).  
22. Sørensen (2003) observed that 
international tax competition shifts the tax 
burden from mobile capital onto 
unemployment-ridden labour. Therefore, 
improved co-ordination of capital taxation 
within the EU was advocated by EC to 
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prevent further shifts of the tax burden to the 
disadvantage of labour. However, some 
degree of healthy taxation competition may 
be favourable to strengthen fiscal discipline 
leading to control of public expenditure, thus 
permitting reduction of tax burden 
eventually.  
23. In an estimation of tax avoidance using 
tax havens, Zucman (2014) found that about 
20% of the profits of US corporations are 
held in in tax havens. This is an increase by 
10 times since 1980. Thus, over the past 15 
years, the effective tax rates of these 
corporates decreased from 30 to 20. About 
two-thirds of this decrease was due to 
increased international tax avoidance. About 
8% of the global financial wealth is parked 
off-shore causing a loss of $200 billion to 
governments every year. Such off-shoring of 
profits continue and increase despite 
tightening of policies of various 
governments. The authors propose creation 
of a world financial registry to address this 
issue. The author noted that three principles 
of corporate taxing agreed at League of 
Nations in 1920 and in operation till 1947 
were source-based taxation, arm’s length 
pricing and bilateral agreements. But 
inconsistencies among nations regarding 
bilateral agreements provided fertile ground 
for multinationals for treaty shopping by 
branching out their governance mechanisms 
at different locations cleverly to take 
advantage of weaknesses of both states in 
bilateral agreements. The author gives the 
example of how Google used these 
inconsistencies cleverly to avoid tax in 
Europe as well as USA. To surmount US 
corporate tax laws on foreign incomes 
including tax credits, tax inversion is 
practised by corporates like Apple, 
Microsoft etc. Profit shifting is done through 
intragroup loans. Subsidiaries in low tax 
countries loan to subsidiaries in high tax 
countries. Another more recent method is to 
manipulate transfer prices, which are the 
prices charged for internal transfer of goods 
and services. It is not possible for tax 
authorities to check whether these internal 
sales were done at market prices as per 
taxation rules. In many cases, there are no 
relevant fair market prices. Such internal 
pricings are rising. The flaws of arm’s length 
pricing are used in such cases. Taxing in 
source countries present two types of 
problems. Firstly, there is wasteful 
expenditure of resources by multinational 
companies. They spend huge amounts for 
exploring and executing treaty shopping and 
transfer pricing opportunities. When tax 
authorities try to control avoidance practices, 
this triggers higher corporate expenses. This 
ends up in non-tax-haven countries having 
lower tax revenues and welfare. Another 
practice is to move core operations of profit 
to low tax countries. Costs of tax 
competition for real investment are high. But 
artificial profit-shifting is more effective in 
reducing corporate tax payments. With 
increasing tax havens as a share of foreign 
profits to almost 55 percent, foreign profits 
also rose as a share of total US corporate 
profits to about 35%. The share of tax 
havens in total US corporate profits reached 
18 percent, which is 55% of the 35% 
recently. The high level of tax-haven profits 
is significant considering that many US-
owned companies do not have any overseas 
activity. During the recent financial crisis, 
there was rapid increase of off-shore profits 
leading to the collapse of domestic profits. 
Typically, if a US firm has an affiliate in 
France owned through an Irish holding, in 
the US balance of payments, a lot of the 
income generated in France will go to 
Ireland. This happens due to disregarding the 
French affiliate for US tax purposes under 
the “check the box” rules. An Irish 
intermediary facilitates avoiding French 
taxes and deferral of US taxes. This type of 
multiple locations and affiliations have been 
practised by many famous US corporates to 
reduce their corporate tax burden. 
Occasionally, firms return a fraction of their 
overseas profits into USA. Some others 
might do it afterwards. But such repatriations 
from low-tax jurisdictions are not 
appreciable and may not increase 
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substantially in the near future due to the 
current law. Even declaration of tax holidays 
for foreign-earned profits do not have much 
impact. The attempt to unify nominal and 
effective corporate tax rates in the US Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 worked well initially. 
However, since the 1990’s, the effective tax 
rate paid by US-owned firms declined from 
30 to 20 percent. This would have added 
$200 billion to US tax collection. Changes in 
US laws indirectly reduced effective tax 
rates further. There had also been decline in 
capital gains of corporates and increase in 
bad debt costs, causing reduction in taxable 
profits. Carry forward of tax loss during 
2008-2009 crisis was also observed. Even 
years after this recession, the effective tax 
rate remains unchanged around 20%. The 
profits of zero taxed S corporations are also 
rising steadily from zero in 1980 to about 
15% of total US corporate profits for some 
years now. This accounts for about 2% fall 
in effective tax rate. Declining foreign tax 
rates may not impact the effective tax rate in 
US.  
24. Based on the results of logit regression 
on 16 tax-aggressive and 16 non-tax 
aggressive Australian corporations, Lanis 
and Richardson (2011) concluded that a 
higher proportion of outside members on the 
board of directors reduced the likelihood of 
tax aggressiveness. This result was 
confirmed using OLS on 401 corporates. The 
types of tax aggressiveness identified by the 
authors are: deductibility of interest 
expenses, transfer of tax losses, capital gains 
tax through corporate restructuring, 
deductibility of costs related to rents and 
leases, sale and lease back transactions, 
capital gains tax losses claims, R & D 
expenses deductibility, off-shore expenses 
exemptions, forward sale of shares and share 
warrants, trading stock manipulations. The 
first five of these were more frequent 
practices. Total assets, total sales and market 
value were higher for tax-aggressive firms 
and effective tax rates was higher (23%) for 
non-tax aggressive firms compared to non-
aggressive firms (19%).  The authors, in a 
later paper Lanis and Richardson (2013) 
analysed the data on 20 tax-aggressive and 
20 aggressive Australian corporations, to 
show that tax-aggressive firms disclose more 
corporate social responsibility activities.  
25. The worldwide tax liability of 
multinationals is strongly determined by 
their domiciliary location. The effective tax 
rate (ETR) is the highest in the case of 
Japanese multinationals, followed by 
American multinationals. Multinationals in 
tax havens have the lowest ETRs.  
Multinationals and domestic-only firms face 
similar ETRs.  ETRs declined worldwide 
over the last two decades; however, the 
ordinal rank from high-tax countries to low-
tax countries remained remarkably constant.  
ETRs vary considerably across industries.  
The evidence mostly shows that the location 
of its foreign subsidiaries affects a 
multinational’s worldwide ETR.  Japan and 
UK have now resorted to territorial taxation 
leaving USA as the highest ETR country. US 
multinationals are now converging towards 
territorial taxation since expenses related to 
foreign-source income can be deducted 
against US income. However, if territorial 
taxation leads to lower ETR in countries like 
Japan and UK, USA may be forced to reduce 
its taxes. In spite of lowering taxes over the 
last two decades, the high tax and low tax 
disparities still continue. Globalization, in 
addition to contributing to these tax reforms, 
produces a herding effect. This is due to tax 
changes in one country driving other 
countries to follow the suit across the world. 
These observations were made by Markle 
and Shackelford (2011) based on financial 
statements of 11,602 public corporations 
from 82 countries for the period of 1988 to 
2009 facilitating country-level estimation of 
effective tax rates.  
26. From a survey of conducted jointly with 
PricewaterhouseCoopers in 85 countries, 
Djankov, Ganser, McLiesh, Ramalho, and 
Shleifer (2010) obtained significant negative 
effect of effective corporate tax rate on 
aggregate investment, FDI, and 
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entrepreneurial activity. Corporate tax rates 
were associated with investment in 
manufacturing but not in services and with 
the size of the informal economy.  
27. Companies promise responsible and 
ethical behaviour to legitimise their social 
credentials.  But organisational culture and 
practices may not match the publicly 
championed claims. The gaps between 
corporate talk, decisions and action 
constitute organised hypocrisy. Many major 
companies promise responsible conduct. But 
they indulge in tax avoidance and evasion. 
Exposure of contradictions between talk and 
action yields negative outcomes (Sikka, 
2010).  
28. The extent of capital mobility and its 
effect on inter-country tax competition were 
discussed through review of literature and 
future directions of research were identified 
by Zodrow (2010). 
29. DeBacker, Heim, and Tran (2015) used 
confidential Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
audit data and found that if corporations are 
owned by individuals from countries with 
higher corruption norms are more likely to 
evade more tax in the US. This effect 
increased with the size of the firm, strongest 
being in the case of small firms. 
Implementation of enforcement measures by 
United States in 2000s had little effective in 
reducing tax evasion by corporations with 
owners from corrupt countries.  
30. The term ‘transfer pricing’ is a method of 
optimal allocation of costs and revenues 
among divisions, subsidiaries and joint 
ventures within a group of related entities. It 
aids in wealth retentiveness within 
companies to avoid taxes and to facilitate the 
flight of capital. In the modern globalisation 
era, transfer pricing is practised to enhancing 
private gains and by avoiding the payment of 
public taxes, it impacts negatively on social 
welfare. This was shown by Sikka and 
Willmott (2010) who examined some of the 
transfer price practices used by corporations 
to avoid taxes in both developing and 
developed countries. 
31. Overesch and Wamser (2010) found that 
German thin capitalisation rules were 
effective in controlling use of tax planning 
by inter-company financing to avoid 
corporate tax.  Legal amendments were used 
as natural experiments in this respect. 
Analysis of German inbound investment data 
showed close relationship between tax rate 
differentials and use of inter-company debt.  
32. Prompt corporate tax payment is an 
easily measurable socially responsible 
behaviour of corporates. On the other hand, 
the payment of corporate tax can be legally 
avoided. This factor sets a boundary 
condition for CSR. The question, then arises, 
if many successful companies actively avoid 
the social obligation of paying their share of 
tax despite law and CSR requiring it, will it 
be social irresponsibility? This question was 
raided by Dowling (2014) and discussed 
many issues connected with credible 
definitions of CSR justifying or not 
justifying tax avoidance in various contexts.  
33. The size of shadow economy and tax 
frauds in 28 EU countries and 31 European 
countries for the period of 2003-2014 were 
investigated by Schneider, Raczkowski, and 
Mróz (2015) using MIMIC method. Average 
size of the shadow economy in the 28 EU 
countries decreased from 22.6% in 2003 and 
to 18.6% of official GDP in 2014. The main 
drivers of shadow economy were 14.6 per 
cent unemployment and self-employment, 
followed by tax morale with 14.5 per cent 
and GDP growth with 14.3 per cent. The 
proportion of tax evasion (accounting for 
indirect taxation and self-employment 
activities) was on average 4.2 per cent (of 
official GDP) in Poland, 1.9 per cent in 
Germany and 2.9 per cent in the Czech 
Republic.  
34. Considering the impact of separate 
effects of host and additional parent country 
taxation on the location decisions of 
multinational firms, Barrios, Huizinga, 
Laeven, and Nicodème (2012) used 
international firm level data to conclude that 
both taxes had negative effects on location 
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decisions. However, international double 
taxation by the parent country, even with the 
general possibility of deferral of taxation 
until income repatriation, seemed a major 
factor in determining the multinational 
enterprise structure.  
35. Both methods of using OLS and 
simultaneous equations by Davis, Guenther, 
Krull, and Williams (2016) proved negative 
relationship between CSR and five-year cash 
effective tax rates. The relationship between 
CSR and tax lobbying expenditures was 
positive. Thus, generally, CSR substitutes 
for tax payments and vice versa.  
36. A novel data-driven approach was used 
by Garcia-Bernardo, Fichtner, Takes, and 
Heemskerk (2017) to identify off-shore 
financial centres (OFCs). The method used 
the global corporate ownership network. In 
this network over 98 million firms (nodes) 
were connected through 71 million 
ownership relations. This granular firm-level 
network data allowed identifying both sink-
OFCs and conduit-OFCs. Sink-OFCs 
attracted and retained foreign capital. 
Conduit-OFCs acted as intermediate 
destinations for routing international 
investments to enable the transfer of capital 
without taxation. The authors identified 24 
sink-OFCs. A small set of five countries 
consisting of the Netherlands, UK, Ireland, 
Singapore and Switzerland were involved in 
canalising most of the corporate offshore 
investment as conduit-OFCs. There is 
geographical area jurisdiction for each 
conduit and high degree of specialization for 
industrial sectors. Thus, sink and conduit 
OFCs are not exotic small islands beyond the 
scope of being regulated, but are located 
highly developed countries.   
37. How corporate tax avoidance is affected 
by any of the three tax system 
characteristics, namely, required book-tax 
conformity, worldwide versus territorial 
approach and perceived strength of 
enforcement across countries. In the analysis 
by Atwood, Drake, Myers, and Myers (2012) 
firm-specific factors, which were previously 
found to be associated with tax avoidance 
namely performance, size, operating costs, 
leverage, growth, the presence of 
multinational operations, and industry, were 
controlled. Other cross-country factors, 
namely, statutory corporate tax rates, 
earnings volatility, and institutional factors, 
were also controlled. The analysis of data 
showed that generally, there was less 
likelihood of firms avoiding taxes, when 
there was higher requirement of book-tax 
conformity or a worldwide approach is used 
or when there was a perception of strong tax 
enforcement. On the other hand, all these 
relationships between tax avoidance and the 
three tax systems characteristics depended 
upon context and the extent of management 
compensation consisting of variable pay, 
bonuses, stock awards and options. 
38. Taxes are important factor for location 
decisions and for multinationals shifting 
profits by transfer pricing. The US and 
Canada use the formula apportionment (FA) 
to tax corporate income. EU countries 
practise separate accounting. Nielsen, 
Raimondos-Møller, and Schjelderup (2010) 
examined how changes in tax rates affected 
capital formation, input choice and transfer 
pricing, spill-overs on tax revenue in other 
countries. A move from SA to FA was 
unable to eliminate the spill-over effect, but 
in specific cases, the shift from SA to FA 
aggravated them.   
39. According to Devereux and Vella (2018) 
digitalization aggravates the problems of the 
current corporate taxing system in the 
international context. This is because, firms 
can use digitalisation technology to spread 
all aspects of the company around the world 
including shareholders, creditors, operations 
and its consumers. The existing system 
involves taxing companies based on where 
their mobile factors are located. A more 
direct and satisfactory method to solve this 
problem may be to move to a system of 
taxing at locations of immobile factors. 
Location of shareholders or of consumers is 
possible. Two specific issues related to 
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digital firms are the two sided markets and 
free usage.  
40. Regression analysis of data on tax return 
form obtained from the Inland Revenue 
Board Malaysia (IRBM) was done by Mohd 
and Saad (2019) to model ETRs of the 
MNCs in Malaysia. The ETR data were used 
as a proxy of the tax avoidance. MNCs in 
Malaysia were found practising tax 
avoidance as their ETRs were lower than the 
statutory tax rates (STRs) as per the Income 
Tax Act 1967. Firm’s size, profitability, 
extent of foreign operation, capital intensity 
and leverage were factors related to tax 
avoidance behaviour of MNCs in Malaysia. 
The policymakers can use high profitability, 
extensive foreign operation, capital intensity 
and high leverage as the selection criteria for 
audit cases of MNCs for tax avoidance.  
41. USA is the only G7 country using 
worldwide taxation system. Deferring tax 
provision does not solve the problem. The 
ability to defer their tax obligation is used by 
as a means of incentivising by US firms to 
invest in projects overseas with lower pre-
tax rates of return. This is distortionary and 
therefore bad economic policy. US 
multinationals with a lot of cash outside the 
US use them for investing in foreign mergers 
and acquisitions. Other methods of domestic 
investment like having a foreign affiliate 
lend earnings to the US parent, guarantee a 
bank loan to the US parent or invest directly 
in the US are deemed to be acts of 
repatriation. So, such types of investments 
would attract payment of the very taxes that 
US firms want to defer. Curiously, funds 
from the foreign affiliate can remain in a US 
bank; but the moment the US parent 
company uses it for productive purposes, it 
attracts repatriation tax. Most major US 
corporates have reinvested $50 to 125 billion 
indefinitely to escape repatriation tax. Due to 
these problems, there is lot of domestic 
borrowing among many US firms. 
Borrowing to fund domestic activities is 
cheaper than repatriating foreign earnings. 
Three-quarters of Apple’s balance sheet is in 
cash and marketable securities. Even then, 
they opt to domestic borrowing to pay 
dividends. This is because it is cheaper to 
pay the interest rate for borrowing than to 
pay the repatriation tax. In effect, this means, 
US firms have done tax planning themselves 
into a territorial system to avoid the ill-
effects of worldwide taxation system of 
USA. Using tax planning has led to 
strategies like Dutch Sandwich or Double 
Irish corporate structures. Apart from 
deferrals and the artificiality of moving and 
holding assets overseas, a state of “earnings 
lockout” also occurs. For financial reporting, 
accrual basis of accounting is practised in 
US. This enables firms to accrue the expense 
for estimated taxes from earnings they owe. 
These earnings can be indefinitely invested 
overseas to avoid making accruals for 
incremental US taxes becoming due when 
repatriated. Therefore, firms with 
indefinitely reinvested earnings can get the 
cash flow benefits of deferring the US tax on 
income earned overseas and also get the 
capital markets benefits. US companies over 
$2.5 trillion in such indefinite reinvestment 
earnings, thus leading to significant losses in 
the form of unrecognized tax liabilities 
(Blouin, 2019). 
“Take Google, for example. The intellectual 
property rights that drive Google are held in 
Google Ireland Holdings (Bermuda). Google 
Ireland LTD, which collects the income from 
data and ad revenue generated by everyone 
Google-ing outside the United States. It then 
has a licensing agreement with Google 
Netherlands Holdings BV, a Dutch entity; 
Google Ireland LTD pays most of its income 
as a royalty payment to Google Netherlands 
Holdings. Google Netherlands Holdings, in 
turn, has a licensing agreement with Google 
Ireland Holdings (Bermuda) to pay 99.8% of 
royalty payment proceeds. The intermediary 
Dutch entity is key. Ireland’s tax rate is 
around 15%. Withholding tax rates are 
imposed on royalties as flows of cash move 
between intermediaries. Transfers directly 
from Ireland to Bermuda, for instance, 
would be taxed at 20%. But with the Dutch 
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intermediary, transfers from Ireland to the 
Netherlands are taxed at 0% because of EU 
trading agreements, and then transfers from 
the Netherlands to Bermuda are also 0%, as 
they are historically close trading partners. 
And Ireland, for its part, is satisfied with the 
income generated from taxing the personal 
income, assets, and economic activity 
indirectly derived from Google’s operations 
located in Ireland. Such arrangements are 
facilitated by the “check-the-box” rule, 
which allows a US corporation to elect, by 
checking a box on their tax return, to have 
certain foreign subsidiaries treated as if they 
do not exist (or are disregarded) for purposes 
of US corporate income tax reporting. The 
US government recognizes only legal 
entities deemed to be corporations. This 
means there is no backstop to prevent the 
creation of such convoluted organizational 
structures to mitigate withholding taxes. 
Check-the-box also enables the practice of 
earnings stripping, a practice by which a 
firm makes a loan to a subsidiary for 
operational expenses, allowing the 
subsidiary to deduct interest payments 
related to this loan from its earnings, avoid 
US anti-abuse provisions and thus reduce the 
firm’s overall tax liability.” (p 4 of (Blouin, 
2019).  
42. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) signed by 
US president Trump on 22 December 2017 
contained many far-reaching revisions of the 
earlier Tax Reform Act of 1986. An 
important change in this law was the 
treatment of traditional "C" corporations (the 
corporations which are subject to a separate 
corporate income tax). As per this Act, 2018, 
the corporate tax rate fell from 35 percent to 
21 percent ex 2108. Some investments 
qualified for immediate deduction as an 
expense. A significantly modified treatment 
was given to multinational firms for their 
activities. The law may increase US capital 
investment which will reflect in an increase 
in US wages. There were debates on the 
impact of the new Act on the extent of 
increase in wages. Within weeks of 
announcement of this Act, major corporates 
announced $1000 for their employees citing 
tax cuts as the reason. Other points discussed 
by Auerbach (2018) about tax rate 
fluctuations and their factors are similar to 
the points discussed by other authors cited 
above.  
43. Lack of socially responsible behaviour of 
corporates by tax aggressiveness need not 
affect reputation according to the results of 
analysis of a number of known cases of US 
corporations by Baudot, Johnson, Roberts, 
and Roberts (2019).  
44. A review of literature by Kovermann and 
Velte (2019) showed that corporate 
governance components like ownership 
structure, board composition, incentive 
alignment between management and 
shareholders, capital market monitoring, 
audit, enforcement and government 
relations, pressure from other stakeholders 
are strongly associated with corporate tax 
avoidance. Effective corporate governance 
mechanisms maintain tax avoidance at the 
optimum level required for the firm. It is 
shown that corporate governance institutions 
can potentially increase tax avoidance to 
make more profit. They can also control tax 
avoidance so that benefits are not overtaken 
by risks.  
45. Data from Chile analysed by Bustos, 
Pomeranz, Vila-Belda, and Zucman (2019) 
showed that a large share of GDP of Chile 
comes from multinationals. In Chile, about 
40 percent of sales come from the 2 percent 
of corporations that have affiliates in foreign 
countries. But they report lower profit and 
effective tax rates are less than local firms. 
Chile implemented a tax reform based on 
arm’s length principle according to the 
OECD guidelines.  A specialised unit was 
created to monitor transfer pricing. However, 
monitoring costs and compliance costs for 
firms increased. There was increased 
demand for tax consulting services. But the 
effect on tax collection is unknown yet.  
46. Based on the data collected from various 
sources, Mueller (2016) noted that the US 
government will have to wait for some time 
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to completely eliminate corporate tax 
inversions practised by US firms. Both the 
firms and the government have their own 
justification for their actions. There is need 
to find a healthy balance between the two.  
47. Based on their analysis, Boot, Logue, 
and Spatt (2017) recommended retention of 
worldwide tax system by USA. The authors 
also recommended elimination of the option 
of deferring tax payment on off-shore profits 
and reduce US tax rates. These suggestions 
seem to be the correct solutions to US tax 
problems.  
48. In their article, Clausing K. A. (2018) 
stressed on the importance of tax revenue for 
a government. Hence it is necessary to 
protect the corporate tax to ensure an 
efficient and equitable tax system. 
International tax policy design should 
consider reforms to reduce the confusion on 
the issue of trade-off between 
competitiveness and corporate tax base 
protection. In this light, formulary 
apportionment, and destination-based 
taxation can be considered.  
49. A study by Ito (2018) also showed that 
Japanese multinationals also determine their 
locations based on tax systems in the host 
country relative to that of home country.  
50. Branston and Gilmore (2019) observed 
that in UK tobacco firms are paying very 
little tax on the huge profits earned by them. 
Considering the harmful health 
consequences of tobacco products, they need 
to be made to pay higher taxes.  The authors 
suggested better reporting and standards of 
corporate taxation. Separate surcharge for 
tobacco companies and charging a tax when 
the companies restructure on corporate tax.  
51. The main channels of tax avoidance by 
multinationals are transfer mispricing, 
international debt shifting, treaty shopping, 
tax deferral and corporate inversions. 
Metanalysis of results in literature by Beer, 
de Mooij, and Liu (2018) showed that for 
every 1 percentage‐point decrease in 
corporate tax rate, there is an increase of 
before-tax income by 1%. This estimate is 
higher than what has been reported 
generally. This average trend seems to 
increase over time.  
52. Businesses avoid corporate income tax to 
get more net profit. Evasion leads to 
economic stagnation. Results obtained by 
Bizņa, Jurušs, Laizāns, and Šnikvalds (2018) 
showed that capital structure of businesses 
will change, and sustainability of firms will 
improve by introducing appropriate tax 
reforms. Application of a model for to help 
government to select more effective tax 
reforms is also suggested.  
53. In a French study, attempt was made by 
Depoers and Jérôme (2019) to relate level of 
disclosures with institutional pressures for 
120 listed companies under high institutional 
setting. All three types of isomorphism 
(coercive, normative and mimetic) were 
found to be associated with widely varying 
levels of disclosures. 
54. In a monograph chapter, Seabrooke and 
Wigan (2018) highlighted the rapidly 
developing politics of corporate taxation and 
the role played by civil societies like Tax 
Justice activists in determining the agenda 
for international tax and in influencing the 
tax practices of most powerful global 
corporations. This development has attained 
more importance since the recent global 
economic crisis. Various complex and multi-
dimensional strategies are being used by 
activists to influence public opinion, formal 
regulation and corporate behaviour 
associated with international taxation.  
55. Devereux and Vella (2018) disputed the 
descriptive view that current international 
taxation is based upon value creation 
principle and normative endorsement of this 
by policy makers. Examples of the confusion 
between demand side and supply side of 
value creation have been provided by the 
authors. Many other factors are also 
discussed.  
56. Analysis of panel data of 60 nations by 
Anguelov (2017) showed that reduced 
corporate tax rates could increase FDI. But it 
decreased annual GDP growth. Thus, tax 
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policies competition can attract investments, 
but may not enhance economic growth 
unless value creation is derived from 
investments for the host country.  
57. After defining and discussing some basic 
aspects related to corporate taxes and 
methods adopted by multinationals for tax 
avoidance, Jalan and Vaidyanathan (2017) 
recommended some policies. There should 
be unified increased attention and efforts by 
regulators and governments for complete 
eradication of banking and commercial 
secrecy globally. When opportunities to 
dodge taxes do not exist, firms will be 
compelled to be tax-compliant. Governments 
should require firms to report income earned 
by affiliates and details of number of 
employees, nature of activity undertaken, 
profits earned, and taxes paid in countries 
they operate. This will reduce transfer 
pricing problems, as it helps to understand 
the true nature of activities undertaken in the 
jurisdiction of their operations and details of 
payment of taxes. The level of discretions 
available to choose the ‘most appropriate’ 
method for determination of arm’s length 
prices should be reduced. If there are too 
many convenient alternatives, it will defeat 
the purpose of the regulation. Guidelines to 
decide on transfer pricing disputes need to be 
established to control transfer price abuses. 
More attention needs to be paid to domestic 
transactions between affiliates in business 
groups irrespective of whether or not they 
are multinational. Such transactions may 
lead to shifting of large amounts of taxable 
income to loss making or tax-favoured 
affiliates.  
58. In a study involving interviews with 
various interest groups related to corporate 
taxes, Hillenbrand, Money, Brooks, and 
Tovstiga (2019) found reiteration of 
established narratives like the business 
groups viewing society as having 
unrealistic/ill-informed expectations and the 
community groups viewing business as ill-
intentioned and too narrowly focused on 
profits. However, there was some 
appreciation of each other’s situations like 
international pressure on companies or 
perceived unfairness in society associated 
with special tax treatments for firms. But 
none questioned the validity of their own 
narratives. The need for companies aligning 
expectations of the community was 
explained using a diagram. The need for 
stakeholders from different networks to 
communicate with each other through 
listening inclusive debate and transparency 
was stressed. Stakeholders want that 
companies rethink their actions and be aware 
of how the community groups perceive their 
motivations and intentions. Credible and 
meaningful exchanges with stakeholders 
need to happen.   
59. The results obtained by Gokalp, Lee, and 
Peng (2017) suggest that formal firms resort 
to tax evasion or reduce compliance costs 
when they face competition from informal 
sector. Costs and benefits of staying within 
the formal sector moderates this relationship. 
Even if business-friendly institutions help 
formal firms tolerate competition from 
informal sector, complicated rules and 
regulations make this adjustment difficult. 
Threat from informal sector can be serious 
and can spread across countries.  
60. A negative association between CSR 
performance and tax aggressiveness of 50 
listed firms in Nigeria for the period of 
2007-2013 was obtained by Mgbame, 
Chijoke-Mgbame, Yekini, and Yekini 
(2017). Firm size and tax aggressiveness 
were also correlated. Negative relationship 
between firm performance and tax 
aggressiveness was also noted. Therefore, it 
seems CSR standpoints and dimension and 
other corporate characteristics determine 
whether and how firms engage in tax 
aggressiveness.  
61. After discussing the history of tax laws 
in Ireland and USA, Barry (2019) examined 
the new Tax Cuts and Jobs Act OF 2017 in 
USA. Shift to territorial system with tax rate 
decreased from 35% to 21% and one time 
toll charge for offshore profits were radically 
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new provisions in the new law. But the 
analysis showed that Ireland is not likely to 
be affected by the new US tax laws based on 
many arguments.  
62. Seeing some negative effects of the new 
US tax laws of 2017, EU and OECD 
introduced some improvements in the 
current tax laws. Barry (2019) concluded 
that from the perspective of Germany as a 
high tax jurisdiction, Base Erosion and Profit 
Sharing (BEPS), Anti-tax Avoidance 
Directive (ATAD) and Country-by-Country 
Reporting (CbCR) do not answer the US tax 
reform. Instead, EU and Germany need to 
increase the international competitiveness of 
their tax systems.  
63. In their article, Hanlon (2018) discussed 
the requirements of OECD/BEPS sponsored 
CbCR requirements. The author pointed out 
to the disconnect between country-by-
country reporting data and current tax policy 
of the arm’s length principle of transfer 
pricing. There are potential benefits of 
country-by-country data. There are also 
potential costs, which include costs of 
increased compliance, future controversies 
and the costs due to possible 
misinterpretations of the data. These 
considerations do have strong implications 
on country-by-country reporting and its 
impact on the international allocation of 
taxing rights.  
64. Poole (2019) noted that corporate tax 
evasion and other aspects of economic 
globalization affect the prosperity of the 
middle class seriously. The substantial losses 
to the government tax revenues is obvious. 
Governments compensate for this by 
increased taxes upon the middle class. So, 
the defaulters enjoy at the cost of the 
vulnerable population. If tax revenues are 
inadequate, slashing of programs and state-
sponsored benefits affect the middle class 
seriously. The author prescribes global tax 
reforms to liberalise the middle class 
population.  
65. Decreasing corporate tax rate during 
1987-2003 led to accelerated investments by 
foreign multinationals contributing to rapid 
increase in GDP in Ireland. For every one 
percent decrease in corporate tax rate, an 
increase in FDI of 4% has been 
demonstrated generally. The effect of 
reduced corporate tax rate in Ireland is 
obvious in this manner (Howard, 2019).  
66. The Nigerian government reduced the 
company income tax rate from 45% to 30% 
gradually over the period of pre-1987 to date 
with the aim of stimulating investment. 
According to Olaleye, Riro, and Memba 
(2016) these reductions have helped the 
country to reduce tax avoidance and evasion. 
Nigeria was able to attract technology-
related investments by reducing effective tax 
rate, tax holidays, tax free dividends, tax 
exemption from minimum tax levy, flat rate 
and relief for carry forward losses. The 
authors used questionnaire survey of 352 
employees from three management levels 
from 32 manufacturing firms for this study.  
67. The European Commission’s tax reform 
proposal for a Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) is aimed to 
reduce the cost of doing business 
substantially by lowering tax compliance 
costs for cross border operations within the 
EU. Barrios, d'Andria, and Gesualdo (2019) 
analysed the recently released unique survey 
data to compare corporate tax compliance 
costs to evaluate the impact of the CCCTB. 
A general equilibrium modelling approach 
was used for this purpose. The results 
showed that reduction in tax compliance 
costs proposed by the CCCTB would 
increase economic efficiency, welfare and 
GDP. The benefit will be higher for member 
countries with the lowest compliance costs 
before the reform and having large stocks of 
foreign investments. Higher benefit for 
cross-border business operations from the 
CCCTB compared to domestic ones can also 
be expected. Non-EU countries will not be 
impacted by the CCCTB.  
68. Methods of avoiding the current double 
taxing of corporates in USA were discussed 
by Burton (2017). The double taxation 
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occurs when corporate income is taxed first 
at the corporate level using a general 
taxation level and again when the income is 
distributed to shareholders as dividends or 
when a capital gain occurs due to sale of 
corporate stock. An integration of the three 
types was suggested to the Congress: 
imposing no entity-level tax, imposing no 
tax on shareholders for dividends or capital 
gains on corporate stock or providing credit 
to shareholders for the already paid entry 
level tax. Different methods of implementing 
the three ways are discussed in detail. 
 
3.2 Notable trends 
 
The trend of topics and findings in the 
selected papers have been tabulated in Table 
1. The total is more than 67 because some 
papers discussed more than one topic and 
accordingly listed in both.  
 
 
Table 1. Trends of topics and findings in the reviewed works 
Notable trends from the 
literature survey 
Findings with references by the serial number in the text 
No of 
papers 
CTR policies and 
characteristics 
Flight of capital, loss of tax revenue, labour productivity and 
wages, retention of income and investments in low CTR 
countries, corporate doublespeak (1), misallocation of profits due 
to separate accounting facilities (8), distortions in loss estimates 
due to income shifting between capital and labour, location and 
FDI (13), , tax liability, location and tax havens affecting tax 
liabilities of countries (25), tax avoidance exists in Malaysia 
(40),levels of disclosures related with the three isomorphisms 
(53), demand side and supply side value creation as a factor of 
CTR (55), some policies related to CTR and its implementation to 
prevent tax avoidance (57), effective steps of Nigerian 
government on CTR (66). 
9 
General decline CTR over 
the period. 
ETR decrease in US over time and reasons (23) 1 
Revenue losses due to tax 
avoidance 
In US (7), $50 billion annual (10), Global $500 billion annual 
varying between country groups (9), coordination costs overriding 
tax avoidance benefits to multinationals (11), 20% held in tax 
havens in the case of US, country differences of ownership for 
corrupt practices (29), effective CG reduces tax avoidance (44), 
Protection of CT and attention to trade-off between 
competitiveness and tax base protection (48). 
7 
USA was the lone G7 
country with highest CTR 
till 2017. 
(41). 1 
OECD/EU attempts to 
improve tax collections and 
reducing CTR 
OECD examining only system of accounting instead of the 
system itself, BEPS (7), Tax reforms in Chile based on arm’s 
length principle increased monitoring and compliance costs (45), 
EU/OECD improvements in current tax laws due to the threat of 
new US tax law 2017 (62), CbCR requirements for BEPS has 
disconnect between data reporting and arm’s length principle of 
transfer pricing and other factors (63), reduction in tax 
compliance costs proposed by the CCCTB would increase 
economic efficiency, welfare and GDP, compliance cost is 
differentiates countries on efficiency impact (67). 
5 
Three types of CTR- 
international, territorial, 
book-tax conformity  
Effect of the three types on tax avoidance tendency (37).  1 
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Table 1. Trends of topics and findings in the reviewed works (continued) 
Notable trends from the 
literature survey 




(US, Canada) separate 
accounting (EU) 
Spill over effect not always affected by moving from SA to FA 
(38).   
1 
New US tax laws 2017  
New law 2017 (42), merits and demerits of new US law, but no 
impact on Ireland (61), negative effects of new US law foreseen 
by EU and OECD (62). 
3 
Methods used by 
multinationals to avoid or 
minimise CT- Google 
example. 
(14), (15), with Google example (23) and (41) location based on 
CTR in the case of Japanese firms also (49), (51). 
6 
International tax shifting/ 
tax sheltering/off-shoring 
(16), (17), sink and conduit offshore financial centres (36). 3 
Tax competitions 
Non-profit taxes also important and economic crisis (21), shift of 
mobile capital to unemployed labour (22), effect of capital 
mobility on international tax competitions (28). 
3 
Tax havens 





Tax aggressiveness less with more independent members on 
boards (24), negative relationship of tax aggressiveness and firm 
factors with CSR performance in Nigeria (60).  
2 
Transfer pricing (30). 1 
Tax frauds, shadow 
economy, parallel economy,  
(33) formal firms resort to tax evasion more when informal sector 
competition is high which can be real threat across countries (59). 
2 
Tax inversions  
High in US due to high CTR and adverse tax policies (4), US 
need to wait for z long time to eliminate tax inversions (46). 
2 
Consequences of high CTR 
Manipulations of foreign income in US (19), regulation of 
corporate power (20), tax avoidance for higher net profit (52).  
3 
Double taxing 
Integrated approach for the three types of taxing to avoid double 
taxing in USA (68) 
 
Relationship of CTR with 
economic growth/GDP or 
FDI and other economic 
development indicators of 
countries 
Host country CTR (2), None related with CTR (3), (6), CTR 
significantly influenced all variables (18), Negative relationship 
of ETR (26), every 1 percentage‐point decrease in corporate tax 
rate, there is an increase of before-tax income by 1% (51), 
Reduced CTR can increase FDI, but decreased GDP growth if 
there is no value creation from investments (56), adverse effect of 
tax avoidance on middle class (64), decrease of CTR by 1% 
increased GDP by 4% in Ireland (65).  
9 
Reducing CTR 
German thin capitalisation effective (31), USA must retain world 
tax system, reduce CTR, eliminate tax deferring options (47). 
2 
Digitalisation effects Aggravates the problem (39). 1 
Surcharges tobacco products  Moral taxing of tobacco industry (50). 1 
Interest groups, civil 
societies 
Influence of civil societies on determination of tax policies (54), 




Window display (1), need for ethical tax practices stressed by 
social activists (11), doublespeak (27), prompt payment as 
responsible behaviour (32), negative relationship between CSR 
and cash effective rate (35), socially irresponsible tax avoidance 





The most researched topics were CTR 
policies, characteristics and impact on tax 
avoidance. Relationship of CTR with 
economic growth variables also received 
high importance. Six papers dealt with 
various methods used by multinationals in 
general. Another 13 papers dealt with 
specific methods like transfer pricing used 
for tax avoidance. So, totally, 22 papers dealt 
with methods used by multinationals for tax 
avoidance specifically. Many others 
contained these methods when discussing 
policies, impacts etc. Notably, relationship 
of tax avoidance with CSR and ethical 
claims and reputational aspects, what interest 
groups and civil societies can do about it 
were discussed by six plus two papers. Most 
papers dealt with many different aspects of 
CTR and interlinked them. So, admittedly, 





The wide variety of methods used by 
multinationals has been amply described and 
illustrated with examples of Google and 
Apple. The boxed description of Google 
above was intended to demonstrate how 
cleverly companies avoid paying any tax 
even when double tax system exists in 
countries like USA. Undoubtedly, high CTR 
and double taxation had been the driving 
factors of corporate misbehaviour in USA. 
The latest Trump revision in 2017 mitigates 
the main defects. Its effect on flight of 
capital and tax compliance need to be 
assessed in future. EU/OECD had been 
stubborn in not correcting the system itself, 
but are satisfied by patchworks when they 
see some problems. One such was the 
marginal improvement made in its tax laws 
when the new US policy 2017 threatened the 
tax base of EU and deprived their enjoyment 
of US tax flaws. Marginal policy 
improvements has contributed to wide 
differences in CTR policies and practices 
across EU members. Such variations have 
resulted in some countries benefitting and 
some not. Such discrepancies will prompt 
EU/OECD to keep on doing minor 
improvements.  
The effect of tax avoidance is felt in almost 
all countries except the tax havens. It will be 
so as long as there are tax havens. Even 
many EU members serve as tax havens and 
thus predate upon the other EU countries. It 
is necessary for EU to address this problem. 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
It is a fact that multinationals resort to 
various methods of avoiding corporate taxes, 
especially in countries where the sales tax is 
high. The countries respond by devising and 
implementing a variety of policies and 
strategies. However, even as the sales tax 
rates are decreasing over the world, tax 
evasion by multinationals continue. 
International tax competition and tax havens 
are the main drivers for continued tax-
negative behaviour of multinationals. It may 
be possible to bind their CSR through civil 
right activities and other interest groups to 
force the corporates to behave properly and 
ethically paying the taxes due from them to 
the countries where their activities create 
value for investments. Otherwise, there will 
be no end to the vicious circle of nations 
devising policies and laws for sales tax and 
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